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For discussion…  Once the 2009 financial meltdown was 
avoided  through  central  banks’ 
decisive action and governments’ swift 
bailouts,  the  general  consensus  was 
that  the  usual  recipes  that  took  us 
back  to  prosperity  and  growth  after 
each of the post war recessions should 
undoubtedly  work  again.  The  main 
tools selected by the authorities were 
fiscal  stimulus,  lowering  of  interest 
rates combined with monetary easing, 
politically  motivated  legislation  and 
high  profile  chastising  to  keep  the 
public  satisfied  that  the  authorities 
were  extirpating  the  roots  of  the 
problem. 
These remedies were applied and, for 
a while, seemed to work: stock prices 
recovered,  the  US  job  market 
stabilized,  bail  out  money  started  to 
be  repaid  and  economic  growth, 
although sluggish, appeared to be well 
into positive territory. 
However,  two  years  later,  another 
serious  financial  crisis  unexpectedly 
struck. 
There seemed to be no reason for it. 
Indeed,  this  had  not  been  the  first 
time  we  faced  a real  estate/financial 
crisis. For example, in 1990, real estate 
prices  went  down  even  more  than 
they  have  had  since  2008.  The 
amounts  dedicated  to  the  stimulus 
packages  and  monetary  easing  were 
unprecedented and imposing pieces of 
legislation  were  quickly  passed.  So 
how could this have happened?  
The answer to this question requires a 
careful  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the 
2008  crisis,  the  then  prevailing 
economic  conditions  and  the 












The 2008 crisis was different 
 
1.1 The subprime crisis was financial 
ll economic crises have a financial dimension. They all result in loss of 
wealth  and  often  involve  the  demise  of  financial  institutions.  But 
unless  they  originate  in  the  financial  system  itself,  they  cannot  be 
considered as financial crises. 
The oil shocks of the 1970s and the burst of the Internet bubble were 
serious economic setbacks. The losses they triggered were arguably larger 
than those caused by the subprime crisis but they did not originate in the 
financial system. As a consequence, the world financial system bent but 
did not break down. After a while, it recovered its composure and was in a 
position to facilitate the subsequent recovery. 
The subprime crisis was different. It struck at the heart of the financial 
system. Although it was the result of a process that had been evolving over 
more  than  30  years  and  that  involved  many  contributing  factors
11,  it 
manifested itself by disrupting the vital and delicate internal structure of 
mutual support between the core global financial institutions.  
As  the  crisis  intensified  in  late  2008,  the  viability  of  these  institutions 
closely linked through interbank lending and a whole spectrum of market 
transactions became a matter of concern and suspicion began to erode the 
mutual confidence without which the international financial system cannot 
operate.  
                                                      
1 . See “The financial crisis: A banker’s perspective” 
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2009RB-02.pdf 
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The  crisis  also  weakened  the  large  banks’  profitability  and,  as  a 
consequence, increased their levels of risk aversion. Nevertheless, as the 
recovery  progressed,  these  conditions  should  have  disappeared  after  a 
couple of years. 
This eventuality, however, would have required that the financial health 
and, most importantly, the profitability of the main participants in financial 
markets be restored. This was not the case for reasons we shall analyze 
later. 
1.2 The 2008 crisis hit an increasingly unbalanced world economy 
The  world  economy  has  never  been  totally  balanced.  From  the  US 
dominance after WW2 to the oil shocks of the 1970’s and the rise of the 
Japanese economy 10 years later, financial strength and weaknesses have 
migrated from one region to another.  However, this time around, the 
globalisation  of  the  economy,  the  free  flow  of  funds  and  the 
interdependence  of  large  financial  institutions  meant  that  economic 
weakness in any part of the world had the potential to become a global 
threat. 
1.2.1 The increasingly fragile financial situation of the US 
The US national debt as a percentage of the gross domestic product has 
been constantly rising since it reached its post war low point of 30% in 
1980. By 2008, it had reached 68%. This level was at the top of the range in 
recent years, even though it did not include 60 trillions in unfunded future 
liabilities (seemingly ignored for the time being by the market in the hope 
of  some  future  political  solution).  At  this  level  of  current  debt,  further 
borrowing was still possible in case of necessity but there was little room 
for any misguided use of these funds.  
The US external debt went from around 6 trillion in 2003 to 13 trillion in 
2008, creating a major international financial imbalance. 
The bulk of the US external deficit can be traced to two structural factors: 
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  The lack of a coherent energy policy since the 80’s has translated 
into a growing external deficit created by oil imports. They have 
increased from about 5 million barrels a day in 1985 to 14 million 
barrels  in  2008  as  domestic  production  went  from  9  million  to 
around  5  million barrels  a  day  over  the  same  period.  The trade 
deficit in dollar terms was exacerbated by the rise in oil prices from 
35$ a barrel in 1985 to 140$ a barrel at the onset of the subprime 
crisis. At that level, the US is sending around 700 billion dollars a 
year abroad. 
  The rise of China as an inescapable manufacturing center. For more 
than 4 decades, China has maintained business friendly and low 
cost policies. Consequently, the country has evolved from cheap 
goods to high tech manufacturing and is now an innovation centre. 
By 2008, China manufacturing output had caught up with the US. 
Accordingly, the US trade deficit in goods with China went from 124 
billion dollars in 2003 to 268 billion dollars in 2008.     
1.2.2 Taking the European dream one step too far 
At the onset of the subprime crisis, the European economy (roughly the 
same size as the US) had largely escaped these problems. Although still 
heavily dependent on foreign oil, its imports ran at about 2/3 of the US and 
thanks  to  a  coherent  energy  policy  promoting  the  rise  of  nuclear  and 
alternative  energy,  imports  were  not  growing.  The  trade  balance  with 
China was about half of the US and EU exports to China were rising at a 
faster pace than imports. 
The weakness was elsewhere.  
Since 2000, the political decision to create the euro currency imposed an 
economic straightjacket on 17 of the 27 countries of the European Union 
that  adopted  the  Euro.  In  order  to  protect  the  credibility  of  the  new 
currency, tight rules such as a maximum yearly deficit of 3% of GDP were 
imposed on the participating countries. Also a European central bank was 
created  with  a  strict  mandate  to  fight  inflation  based  on  the  German  
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Bundesbank  model.  It  all  seemed  to  work  well  during  the  economic 
expansion that preceded the subprime crisis to the point where the Euro 
was seen as a possible replacement of the US dollar as a reserve currency.  
By  2009,  however,  the  3%  deficit  rule  had been  transgressed by  most 
countries. The Eurozone had a deficit of 6.3%; France 7.5%. Even Germany 
was above the ceiling at 3.3% and they all did so without the imposition of 
penalties  of  any  sort.  More  importantly,  a  keen  observer  would  have 
noticed that from its inception the Euro had bundled up countries with 
very different economic profiles, industrial development, size and benefits 
for the civil service, inflationary expectation and work ethics.  
As a result, within 8 years of the creation of the Euro, unit labour cost had 
gone up 50% in Greece, 20% in Italy and Spain while it went down 19% in 
Germany.  The  lack  of  mobility  of  the  European  work  force  due  to 
disparities in languages, traditions and education systems did not allow the 
Eurozone  to  even  out the  differences  but, on the  contrary,  kept  them 
confined within each respective country.  
However, in 2008, no one would have listened to such a keen observer, as 
everyone then focused on the success of the Euro. 
1.2.3 The massive growth of financial markets 
The  growth  of  financial  markets  has  been  phenomenal  since  the 
liberalization that started in the 1980s.  
As an example, the foreign exchange market grew from a daily volume of 
70 billion in the 80s to 1.5 trillion in the 90s and 3.7 trillions dollars in the 
next decade. 
Perhaps more importantly, the derivative market in terms of outstanding 
contracts went from practically nothing in the 80s to 20 trillion in the mid- 
90s,  reaching  259  trillions  in  2005  and  now  estimated  at  1200  trillion 
dollars in 2010 or 25 times the world’s yearly output. 
A careful examination of the lessons from too big to fail, as exemplified by 
the bank Herstatt in Germany to the Greek sovereign debt crisis, shows  
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that it is not the size of the failing entities that counts but their capacity to 
destabilize  any  of  the  global  financial  markets.  These  markets  are  the 
entities that are too big to fail; and understandably so, as no country or 
even the whole world  is able to hold them back if they come crashing 
down, thereby creating an insurmountable economic crisis. 
These markets are supported by a relatively small number of core market- 
making  financial  institutions  that  are  highly  interlinked  through  their 
reciprocal transactions. So in time of acute crisis, they have to be rescued 
at all costs giving taxpayers the wrong impression that governments are 
protecting the rich bankers at their expense while, in fact, the authorities 
are  scrambling  to  avoid  a  financial  collapse  and  a  global  economic 
meltdown. 
By 2008, many governments were facing a crushing and ill appreciated 
obligation to protect their national banking systems. The ratio of national 
banks’  debt  to  annual  tax  revenues  had  reached  astonishing  levels  for 
some countries: 25 times for Ireland and more than 10 times for France, 
Spain, Italy or Switzerland.  
This set of unbalances meant that the steering the banking system out of 
the  subprime  crisis  required  delicate  manoeuvring  and  international 
cooperation,  and  left  very  little  room  for  error.  Unfortunately, 
governments  did  not  grasp  these  new  constraints  and  decided  quasi 
unilaterally  to  adopt  the  same  ponderous  measures  that  were  used  in 
previous crisis, approaches that ended having the opposite impact. 
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Does the financial reform bill hit the target? 
 
 
 careful analysis of the 2008 crisis
1 led us to envisage three possible 
subsequent scenarios. 
The first scenario comprised a quick and painless rebound. Based on the 
huge  amount  of  liquidity  injected  in  the  economy,  a  rapid  recovery  in 
equities shortly followed by other markets (with the exception of the real 
estate market unable to recover quickly after being so seriously discredited 
among  risk  departments  of  banks)  takes  place.  As  confidence  returns, 
governments  recoup  some  of  the  bailout  money  and  pressure  on 
politicians  eases.  All  participants--  banks,  hedge  funds  but  also  central 
banks, lawyers, accountants, rating agencies and regulators-- are eager to 
revert to previous conditions before further structural damage undermines 
the  usual  way  of  conducting  their  affairs.  As  no  significant  corrective 
measures were taken, this scenario leads to new bubbles and subsequent 
crisis. 
The second scenario presented the possibility of a deepening recession 
and  serious  market  weakness  as  a  result  of  misguided  decisions.  As  a 
consequence, governments efforts are unsuccessful and they get further 
involved in supporting, regulating and even managing the financial system 
to  the  point  where  they  put  themselves  at  risk.  The  resulting  dirigiste 
intervention into the financial system creates inefficiencies, stifles financial 
and  industrial  innovation,  entrepreneurship.  Ultimately,  economy 
continues its downward spiral. 
A 
SECOND PART  
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The third scenario advanced a balanced approach whereby a reasonable 
short  term  recovery  fuelled  by  injection  of  liquidity  and  well  devised 
stimulus  plans  creates  enough  breathing  space  for  the  main  actors  to 
cooperate and implement long term measures that address the real causes 
of the crisis. In this course  of events, a long lasting recovery is possible 
provided: 
  Governments  adopt  a  calm  attitude  to  reassure  the  public  and 
avoid  interfering  in  areas  outside  their  competence.  Equally 
important is their capacity to resist the temptation to use borrowed 
funds  for  political  purposes.  Rather  they  apply  their  limited 
financial firepower to critical bailouts and support of the economy 
in ways that stimulate future growth. 
  Central banks improve their capacity to identify financial bubbles 
and act early to restrain them. 
  Regulators revise the failed risk models; they also promote reliance 
on traditional approaches used in banks’ risk departments, extend 
their reach to establish adequate ethical rules for the key service 
providers such as rating agencies, auditing firms and legal firms that 
played a pivotal role in the crisis. They also avoid a heavy-handed 
approach  that  would  dampen  the  risk  and  lending  appetite  of 
financial institutions. 
  Financial  institutions  take  urgent  steps  to  rectify  the  risk 
management  shortcomings  highlighted  by  the  crisis.  But  most 
importantly they remain part of the decision process adopted to 
tackle the crisis; in this way, their financial health (both the quality 
of their balance sheet and P&L) is preserved. 
Unfortunately, major missteps on both sides of the Atlantic did not allow 
the third scenario to play out. 
Unfortunately, 
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2.1 First misstep: the US stimulus plan 
Any effective long-term solution to the subprime crisis required a stimulus 
plan to avoid an economic depression, restore confidence and provide the 
necessary time to put in place well conceived remedial measures. 
Whether it was a supply side or Keynesian in nature did not matter but it 
had to be large enough to match the scale of the crisis and provide the 
strongest multiplier effect. Indeed, the high level of US public debt after 
700 billion dollars were spent in bailouts and the likelihood of declining tax 
revenues due to the forthcoming recession meant that such package could 
not be replicated in the future.  
The  US  2009  stimulus  plan  provided  little  multiplier  effect.  Indeed,  a 
breakdown of the 789 billion dollars plan showed that: 
  9.2%  of  the  total  package  was  dedicated  to  items  without  any 
impact on economic activity. 
  78.5%  was  committed  to  the  short-term  preservation  of  jobs, 
support of spending power of the unemployed, large construction 
and road maintenance projects. These programs were capable of 
sustaining the economy while funds were still available but could 
hardly seed new competitive industries. 
  Only  12.3%  was  dedicated  toward  industries  that  improved  US 
competitiveness  or  to  research  projects  having  the  potential  to 
promote innovative industries. 
The US plan could have worked if, as in past crises, a recovery could quickly 
take  place.  But  this  is  not  what  happened.  The  bulk  of  funds  went  to 
construction projects with no impact on future exports or competitiveness 
and, while it did sustain consumption, it did further aggravate the trade 
imbalance. 
By contrast, funds directed to industries with real multiplier effects and 
capable of creating permanent jobs in areas of US business strength such 
as  health,  aerospace,  finance  etc  were  narrowly  targeted  and  
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comparatively small. Indeed, general measures to help innovation such as 
better funding of NASA, DARPA or simply to lowering the capital gain tax in 
order to promote venture capital would have been preferable to selecting 
the recipient of funds down to the level of specific companies (in some 
cases with disastrous outcomes) as some government agencies did.  As an 
example  of  this  lack  of  foresight,  NASA,  which  historically  returned  8 
dollars of economic benefit to the US economy for every dollar spent, did 
not benefit from the stimulus plan but instead had its budget reduced in 
2011.   
The  obvious  conclusion  is  that  the  stimulus  plan  was  mis guided  and 
although it could sustain the economy as long as funds lasted, it would not 
reverse the downturn. 
By  comparison,  the  European  stimulus  plan  was  smaller  and  better 
targeted. It amounted to 200 billion euros and rested on a mix of tax cuts, 
investment incentives and unemployment support.  
2.2  Second  misstep:  the  enactment  of  overbearing  financial 
regulations in the US and Europe 
Adjusting the financial regulatory system had to be part of any long-term 
solution  of  the  subprime  situation.  However,  the  unique  nature  of  the 
crisis  demanded  a  careful  approach  based  on a  consensus  of  the  main 
players
2. Governments who had to conduct highly unpopular bailouts, 
decided  nonetheless  to  sidestep  meaningful  input  from  financial 
institutions  and  enact  heavy -handed,  wide-ranging  legislation  aimed 
mainly at restraining large banks and the investment banks perceived to be 
the main culprits. They also seized the occasion to regain control of a 
                                                      
2 See “The Wall Street reform and consumer protection act: A long lasting solution to the 
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sprawling  global  financial  industry  that  had  become  a  threat  to  their 
authority. 
2.2.1 The US response: the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform and consumer 
protection act 
This imposing piece of legislation rushed through Congress and signed into 
law in July 2010 is a political response to the crisis. As it name indicates, it 
is  aimed  at  the  perceived  culprit:  Wall  Street.  Although  it  leaves  some 
flexibility in its application, it does create a constraining framework for the 
US financial industry. 
Our  detailed  analysis  of  the  bill
3  showed that some measures such as 
better oversight of  rating agencies (steering them toward a much more 
conservative attitude, a move some governments came to regret when 
they themselves were downgraded), creating a financial stability oversight 
council, and creating transparency and accountability for derivatives went 
in the right direction; while others, such as slowing down the process of 
emergency  intervention  in  times  of  crisis  by  involving  congress  were 
downright dangerous.  
However, it is the consequences of the new constraints imposed on the 
banking system that are more relevant to the present crisis. New measures 
such as: 
  Transferring most over the counter derivatives into open exchanges 
  Credit risk retention for securitized credits 
  Consumer protection 
  Prohibition of proprietary trading (Volcker rule) 
  Putting a lid on the banks size (Volcker rule)  
were all clearly detrimental to banks’ profitability. 
                                                      




Additionally, within the Dodd-Frank bill, new rules were too vague to even 
allow a fair assessment of their negative impact on banks’ future results 
and created further uncertainty. As a consequence banks’ share prices, 
already depressed by the crisis, did not recover along with the market. 
As  well,  new  rules  implemented  under  the  Basel  III  required  banks  to 
increase  progressively  their  capital  in  order  to  improve  their  ability  to 
withstand  future  crisis.  It  was  agreed  internationally  in  2010  at  a  time 
when banks share prices were depressed and, as a result, it has become a 
very expensive proposition to raise new capital. 
There is no doubt that raising the level of banks capital can be valuable in 
turbulent times. However, it only affords partial protection to the banking 
system. By necessity, banks are highly geared, since otherwise they could 
not play their role in creating and circulating money. Even the most recent 
rules allow a 10 times gearing ratio. Clearly, no bank geared at such level 
could withstand a run on its deposits whatever its level of capital. Similarly, 
a 10% write off of its loan portfolio could wipe out its capital. 
At the same time, the 2008 crisis has shown that banks’ ability to remain 
profitable and provide clear guidance of future results, is equally, if not 
more important to the interbank market and depositors. Also, it is good 
results  rather  than  an  arbitrary  level  of  capital  that  give  banks  more 
confidence to lend.  
Faced with a combination of increased credit risks in a weak economy, 
unfavourable  profit  outlook  and  the  steep  cost  of  raising  new  capital, 
banks did not have any other choice than curtail their credit portfolio and 
drastically reduce new lending. 
Indeed, between 2008 and 2010, commercial bank lending was reduced by 
25% in the US and the M1 money multiplier was reduced almost by half. 
A main engine of recovery had stalled! 
There is no doubt 
that raising the 
level of banks 
capital can be 
valuable in 
turbulent times. 
However, it only 
affords partial 
protection to the 
banking system.   
18 
2.2.2 European measures 
The EU financial reform legislation pointed in the same direction as the 
Dodd Frank bill and, to a large extend, prompted European banks to also 
reduce lending. There were, however, some important differences. 
Europeans  were  more  focused  on  protecting  their  banks.  By  increasing 
supervision, requesting an accelerated implementation of Basel III capital 
rules and also by moderating the derivatives trading and swaps push-out 
rules, they better protected bank profitability and outlook.  
Eurozone banks operating under stricter lending rules were less affected 
by the subprime crisis than their UK counterparts. 
Although their share price plunged in 2008 in step with the market, there 
was  no  headline  bankruptcy  and  they  rebounded  faster  than  their 
American  counterparts.  So,  for  a  while  at  least,  the  Eurozone  financial 
institutions  seemed  somewhat  insulated  from  the  crisis.  Their  recent 
difficulties are of a different nature.  
Blinded  by  faith  in  their  monetary  union  and oblivious  of  its  structural 
problems, Eurozone regulators allowed their banks to place their liquidities 
in bonds of any participating country without discrimination. Moreover, 
some  banks  acquired  large  networks  in  southern  Europe  and,  as  a 
consequence,  were  required  to  hold  bonds  of  their  host  countries  for 
liquidity purposes.  
As the crisis revealed starkly the risk differential between countries and as 
markets priced them accordingly, Eurozone banks were tempted to make 
additional profits through further purchases of risky bonds as allowed by 
the regulators.  
When  the  level  price  differential  in  bonds  and  the  rating  downgrades 
exposed the extent of the problems, the authorities ordered a stress test 
for their banks but in doing so asked the regulator to specifically exclude 
the  Eurozone  sovereign  risk  from  their  computation.  This  unacceptable 
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interference  of  the  political  establishment  with  the  regulatory  system 
greatly alarmed the markets.     
2.3 Third misstep: central banks lose sight of their role 
Central  banks,  through  their  swift  and  coordinated  action  in  2008 
prevented  a  total  economic  meltdown.  Having  learned  from  the  great 
depression, they followed up with a series of measures meant to avoid the 
mistakes made 80 years before; these were intended to be temporary. This 
textbook response, already implemented in previous slowdowns with good 
success, was supposed to avoid a deep economic contraction, allow the 
banking system to bounce back, and ignite a recovery. 
As the economic slowdown lingered and unemployment remained high, 
central banks, in frustration, persisted and amplified their original plan. In 
the process, they made two fundamental mistakes. 
2.3.1 Central banks persist in their very low interest rates policy 
Interest rates were lowered considerably after the Internet bubble burst, 
as a standard measure to soften the consequences of the stock market 
debacle. As the recovery seemed progressive and inflation under control 
(in part because of cheap Far East imports but also due to the exclusion of 
assets and real estate prices from the inflation index formula), the Fed 
mistakenly maintained them at a low level. This decision led to the real-
estate bubble and sub prime situation.  
In view of the severity of the 2008 crisis, the Fed and the ECB took the 
unprecedented  decision  to  drop  interest  rates  to  practically  0%  in  an 
attempt to revive the economy. However, as time went by, the expected 
improvement  in  economic  activity  did  not  transpire.  In  theory,  a  low 
interest rate policy supports economic recovery by: 
  Lowering the cost of loans to private and corporate borrowers; 
  Allowing banks to borrow cheaply and absorb past losses through 
improved spreads between borrowing and lending.  
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In this new environment, bank lending had collapsed and, consequently, 
the beneficial effect of the 0% interest rate policy had been negated.  The 
adverse effects of this policy persisted: it penalized savers and retirees 
with the effect of further depressing consumption. It also created on both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  unsustainable  liability  gaps  for  private  and  public 
pension  funds  whose  projections  were  based  on  much  higher  returns. 
Finally it reduced the cost of raising sovereign debt, encouraging further 
government spending through borrowing. In fact, for many countries, debt 
has  now  reached  such  levels  that  it  is  becoming  politically  difficult   to 
envisage any meaningful rise of interest rates and debt servicing costs. 
Nevertheless,  central  banks  have  decided  to  maintain  interest  rates  at 
these historically low levels even going as far to announcing as in the US 
that they will be held there for the next two years. 
2.3.2 Central banks depart from their mandate 
The Federal Reserve launched its first round of monetary easing (QE1) to 
the tune of 1.5 trillion in 2008. Adding liquidity aggressively has been used 
in  earlier  crises,  but  this  time  around  the  Fed  also  decided  to  book 
extraordinary risks on its balance sheet. Indeed, 1.25 trillion was allocated 
to the purchase of mortgage-backed securities in the hope of unleashing a 
huge  wave  of  mortgage  refinancing  followed  by  renewed  consumer 
spending. 
By 2010, it was clear that this approach had failed due in large part to the 
paralysis of the banking system. The real estate market had not recovered 
and consumers were more interested in paying back debt than borrowing. 
Nonetheless, the Fed opted for a second round (QE2) of 900 billions dollars 
dedicated to the purchase of treasury bills. 
The new round did not work any better but did increase the Fed’s balance 
sheet to 2.8 trillion dollars or more than 3 times its size in 2008. It also 
helped the US treasury issue the necessary amounts of bonds to finance its 
dangerously  high  deficit  and  contributed  to  the  solvency  of  the 
government.   
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In this sense, the Fed became another political tool. In fact, when the US 
long term debt got downgraded, it did not take long for the Fed to declare 
that they would be buying long term T bonds and selling short term T bills. 
Whether this move was intended to help out the government or boost the 
economy as officially announced is unclear; it definitely increased the Fed’s 
balance sheet risk profile. 
In  Europe,  the  ECB,  true  to  its  primary  mandate  of  maintaining  price 
stability, kept its finances under better control at the beginning of the sub 
prime crisis. However, as the Eurozone crisis – an existential risk for the 
ECB  –  gained  momentum,  it  started  providing  liquidity  much  more 
aggressively  doubling  its  balance  sheet  to  2.2  trillion  euros  (3.1  trillion 
USD) in 2011. 
In the process, the ECB risk profile deteriorated quickly. Only 4 days after 
confirming on May 6 2010 its commitment not to buy sovereign debt, it 
announced  an  unlimited  program  of  sovereign  and  corporate  debt 
purchase.  Since  then,  the  ECB  has  been  dangerously  climbing  the  risk 
curve.  
As it stood at the end of 2010, its assets included 360 billion euros (500 
billion  USD)  of  “non  marketable  securities”  and  260  billion  euros  (360 
billions USD) of loans to Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  
Despite the obvious weakness of its balance sheet - now posting a 23 times 
gearing ratio – it extended in October 2011 an unlimited amount of credits 
to the now troubled Eurozone banks. 
This policy, it must be said, is highly unusual for a responsible central bank. 
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3.1 From one financial crisis to another 
t is now easier to see how the 2011 financial crisis was brought on. 
At first, the classic response seemed to work according to plan. In March 
2009,  after  Goldman  Sachs  announced  relatively  good  results,  stock 
markets  started  to  rally  worldwide.  As  an  advanced  indicator,  this  was 
perceived as a sign that the economy would follow suit 6 to 9 months later. 
Indeed,  propped  by  the  stimulus  plan  and  QE1,  the  US  economy  was 
emerging out of recession and even if the pace was slow, it was surely a 
matter of time before it reached full recovery mode. The Dodd-Frank bill 
was then signed and the Europeans were advancing their legislation at 
their own pace.  
Everything seemed under control. 
The conclusion of our analysis of the sub prime crisis one year later
3 was 
completely different. 
As soon as the Dodd Frank bill became law and details of its European 
equivalent  were  known,  it  became  clear  that  scenario  3  of  our  earlier 
analysis  of  the  2008  crisis–  the  only  one  allowing  a  stable  long-term 
solution – was no longer possible. As a consequence, what appeared as a 
progressive and orderly return to economic normality was in fact the result 
of a tug of war between, on the one hand, economic expansion fuelled by 
I 
THIRD PART  
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the 0% interest rate policy and the huge amount of liquidity forced into 
markets by central banks as well as various stimulus plans and, on the 
other  side,  recessionary  forces  relating  to  concerns  over  soaring 
government  indebtedness,  central  bank  risky-loan  policy  and,  most 
importantly, a serious contraction of bank lending. 
The record levels of markets volatility during that period is a manifestation 
of  this  unstable  balance.  It  became  clear  that  as  soon  as  one  side 
weakened, the reaction in the opposite direction would be violent and 
disorderly. 
And this is what happened in June 2011. 
As the stimulus plan in the US ended and the Fed decided prudently to 
avoid  a  QE3,  expansionary  forces  ran  out  of  fuel,  fear  took  over  and 
markets  skidded.  And  as  the  prospects  of  an  American  lead  recovery 
faded,  markets  turned  their  attention  towards  the  so vereign  debt 
problems of the Eurozone. 
The  downgrades  of  the  weak  Eurozone  countries  by  rating  agencies 
followed a steep rise in bond yields. Blinded by the Euro dogma, Eurozone 
leaders, in a state of disbelief and convinced that the measures put in 
place would soon work, hesitated, and then tried to hide the true extent of 
the  problem.  In  the  end,  facts  prevailed  and  the  European  authorities 
requested  creditors  to  accept  a  voluntary  50%  haircut  on  their  Greek 
bonds. This precedent demonstrated that the Eurozone was prepared to 
drop its support to its weaker members. Even more troubling, the measure 
was devised in a way to avoid a default event that would have triggered 
CDS  payments.  Private  lenders  were  left  facing  losses  on  presumed 
covered  positions  and  the  Eurozone  sovereign  debt  CDS  market  was 
effectively crippled. In these circumstances, any private sector reasonably 
priced  funding  in  the  Eurozone  became  problematic.    The  stronger 
Eurozone countries, the ECB and the IMF had to step in at their own risk, 
while the banks of the region were considerably weakened.    
And so a new crisis has now developed, and we are again at risk of another 
recession on both sides of the Atlantic. But in the current context: 
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  The US and the EU have squandered their reserves. As their debt 
reach unacceptable levels and they remain under watch by rating 
agencies  and  markets,  their  capacity  to  conduct  a  credible 
expansionary policy is seriously restrained;    
  Faced with economic uncertainty, large corporations and banks are 
holding on to their cash. 
  Central  banks,  the  last  and  most  respected  containment  to 
speculation,  (not  the  least  because  of  their  unlimited  power  to 
print money) have increased their balance sheets and risk profiles 
to the point where they themselves are at risk of losing credibility 
and on the verge of inducing inflation.    
Under these circumstances, what does the future hold? 
3.2. The two possible outcomes 
In the past 3 years, the US and the EU have tried traditional economic 
recipes to extricate themselves from the crisis. They have failed so far. The 
hope  that  China  could  pull  them  out  of  trouble  is  also  misplaced.  The 
Chinese economy is only a fifth of the US and EU combined. The Italian 
debt would consume half of its reserves. It simply does not have, at this 
stage, the economic power to do so and could run the great risk of being 
dragged into the crisis.   
Markets vigilance has imposed a new discipline and triggered a wave of 
often-disorderly budgetary contractions. By themselves, these contractions 
can only intensify the recession and increase budgetary deficits through 
lower tax intakes. Massive social costs (and, in the case of the EU, political 
costs)  will  have  to  be  faced.  Financial  solutions  have  run  their  course. 
Growth strategies rooted in the real economy are needed, and this is why 
authorities are now at a cross road that points in only two main directions.  
3.2.1 The recovery scenario 
Such a scenario requires governments in the US and Europe to address 
their fundamental unbalances that impede a sustained recovery.  
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But they have to travel a narrow road that starts in the US. Indeed, the EU 
does not seem to have political institutions able to react with sufficient 
speed and determination to extricate itself from the current economic and 
social turmoil. The US has to lead the way and, fortunately, has a trump 
card it could put into play quickly: its huge energy reserves. The recovery 
scenario could then play out as follows 
In  the  US,  a  comprehensive  energy  policy  including  a  vast  oil  and  gas 
drilling program and some rise in fuel taxes is announced. Markets react 
quickly and the price of oil drops, giving some relief to stretched consumer 
finances. When the program gets underway, tax revenues increase and the 
budget  deficit  outlook  improves.  As  markets   take  notice  and  rise, 
corporations feel more confident to put their cash at work and resume 
hiring.  
With  more  means  at  its  disposal  and  less  political  pressure,  the 
government decides to tone down its criticism of banks and to repeal large 
parts of the Dodd Frank bill in order to restore the profitability prospects 
of US banks. 
As their share values rise, banks decide to strengthen their balance sheets 
by  issuing  shares  at  a  now  more  acceptable  price.  Confidence  in  the 
financial system returns, unleashing a wave of new lending. 
The situation keeps improving and lawmakers can focus again on long-
term  competitivity.  A  comprehensive  program  aimed  at  restoring 
technological advance in areas such as healthcare, aerospace or finance 
and enhance exports is put in place. Innovation linked capital gains tax is 
reduced and meaningful funds are directed toward government agencies 
that create value in new technologies such as NASA or DARPA.  
Meanwhile, in Europe, the EU realizes that imposing drastic consolidation 
demands on the weakest countries with total disregard to the human cost 
– indeed a surprising approach for a continent that prides itself for its 
social concerns - deepens the continent’s recession and creates serious 
social  unrest.  Markets  react  to  the  precedent  created  by  the  imposed 
haircuts on Greek bonds. They understand that, if it is in its interest, the EU  
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not only can and will let down creditors of their member states, but will 
deny  them  CDS  protection  as  well  by  avoiding  default  events  through 
clever  legal  schemes.  Accordingly,  investors  do  not  participate  in bond 
issues from weak countries. As Italy and Spain come under attack, the ESFS 
loses all credibility for lack of means and the situation becomes untenable. 
The EU ultimately takes the logical decision to disentangle the strong and 
weak economies from the Euro straightjacket. This is planned carefully and 
done in an orderly manner. The ECB gets a mandate to support the new 
currencies until they progressively float.  
The process is painful and involves some degree of sovereign default. But 
as the countries leaving the Euro regain competitivity and reduce their 
unemployment on the basis of their weaker currency, confidence returns 
to the old continent and growth resumes. Central banks revert to their 
natural mandate. They can now mop up liquidity and bring their balance 
sheets  under  control.  As  the  recovery  gets  under  way,  they  can  raise 
interest rates and control inflation. 
Clearly this scenario is not easy to achieve and holds some serious risks but 
it remains vastly better than the alternative.  
3.2.2 The downward spiral 
Governments,  by  lack  of  political  strength,  decide  to  hold  on  to  their 
current policies in the hope that, somehow, prosperity will return, as it did 
after recessions.  
As new financial sector regulations are enforced, banks’ profitability and 
share prices continue to decline. The cost of regulatory capital becomes so 
high that their managements decide to further reduce lending rather than 
raise capital. Even when credits are extended, the interest rates charged 
become  prohibitively  expensive  after  taking  into  account  the  cost  of 
additional  capital  and  the  potential  provisions  for  bad  debts  in  a 
recessionary climate. As a consequence lending dries up, prolonging the 
recession and frustrating politicians.  
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Markets and rating agencies keep a close watch on sovereign debt levels 
further  reducing  governments’  borrowing  capacity.  New  stimulus 
programs are now out of the question and instead very conservative, and 
therefore recessionary fiscal policies, are widely adopted. Investors stop 
lending to weaker countries and several Eurozone members default. 
Politicians realize that their last solution to induce growth is to coerce their 
central banks into more vigorous intervention. Central banks are asked to 
buy more sovereign bonds or even bypass the banking system by lending 
directly  to  companies  -  as  the  UK  is  now  considering  -  thus  raising 
considerably their risk profile. More dangerously, they are prodded into 
adding unreasonable amounts of liquidity in the market, creating inflation, 
market  bubbles  and  undermining  their  currency.  Eventually,  the 
confidence in central banks is lost. 
Faced  with  a  lingering  recession,  a  devalued  currency,  an  expensive 
borrowing cost and rising inflation, the temptation is high for governments 
to resort to a dirigiste approach. Through nationalizations or regulations, 
they compel banks to lend creating more distrust in the interbank market. 
Rating agencies lose their independence; regulators are ordered to ignore 
some risks (as already has been the case in the EU). As governments take 
control of their domestic markets, global finance gets fragmented followed 
by diminished international trade and protectionism rises. 
The tug of war between inflationary and recessionary measures continues 
to  generate  markets  volatility.  The  economic  mood  will  shift  from 
depressive to hopeful and confident but the general trend points toward 
recession. As more money is printed, prices of assets and commodities rise 
followed by consumer goods. Headline inflation climbs.  
In the end, this scenario points to an inflationary global recession and the 
destruction of the economic progress achieved in the last 30 years, not 
because the original model was flawed but for lack of understanding of the 







inancial markets have now reached such size that keeping them in 
balance has become an absolute priority as by falling, they could crush 
the world global economy. 
Overlooking this important fact and confident that they understood well 
the  workings  of  these  markets,  governments,  central  banks,  market 
makers and operators tried to manipulate the financial system to their 
own advantage. This resulted in bubbles and crisis of growing magnitude in 
various economic areas and culminated in the 2008 crisis, which hit at the 
heart of finance.  
Governments did not appreciate properly the magnitude and complexity of 
the situation and the forces at play. Instead of bringing together all the 
players to try and find an unbiased long-term solution to the crisis, they 
decided to resolve the crisis practically on their own by applying recipes 
that worked in the past but were not adapted to the new situation. Their 
attempt has been, so far, unsuccessful. 
As one would expect, none of the two extreme scenarios described above 
will play out as such. It is possible that the world economy tacks in one 
direction and then the other creating market highs and lows of increasing 
magnitude.  Some  economic  region  could  adopt  the  right  policies  while 
another  keeps  on  applying  failed  recipes  thus  generating  geographical 
tensions  and  large  currency  movements.  Black  swan  occurrences  could 
seriously disturb how the scenarios play out. 
However, as events unfold and decisions are taken, it might be possible to 
identify which of the outcomes described above becomes more likely and 
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At this stage, it is too early to assess what scenario will prevail but the 
almost  inexistent  debate  over  energy  policy  in  the  US,  talks  of  direct 
support of corporate loans by the Bank of England and, in the Eurozone, 
attempts  to  manipulate  the  CDS  market  or  political  intervention  in 
member countries who resist the official rescue plan, do not suggest that a 
real understanding of the situation by the authorities is imminent nor that 
there is yet a will to change their approach. 3  
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